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Stigma and Labour Market outcomes: Sex work and domestic work in India
In this paper, we examine whether the earnings of sex workers in India are significantly 
different from those in domestic work, a trade that is also gendered in nature and can be 
done with similarly low levels of training and education. We analyse this using data 
collected during fieldwork in the cities of Kolkata and Delhi in India. Our results confirm 
that there is a significant difference in wages between the two groups of workers. We 
consider the extent to which the stigma attached to sexwork contributes to the higher 
wages in this occupation relative to domestic work. To do this, we control for endogeneity 
caused by selection on unobservables. We find that stigma is a significant contributory 
factor to the wage differential. We also preliminarily consider an alternate explanation – 
that of violence in the trade. We find that the experience of violence in the trade does not 
affect the take home earnings of the individuals. 
Keywords: sex work; domestic work; stigma; earnings premium abuse
Introduction
One recurring issue in the economics literature on sex work relates to the high earnings in sex 
work relative to other occupations that require similar amounts of skill or training. The literature 
provides three main explanations for this high earnings puzzle: the opportunity cost of foregoing 
marriage (Edlund and Korn, 2000), compensation for the stigma of being associated with the 
trade (Della Giusta et al., 2008), and the risks involved in the trade (Arunachalam and Shah, 
2008). It is, of course, likely that having to forego marriage or being the victim of violence 
themselves relate to the stigma attached the trade. Since stigma could be the factor underlying 
both the marriage and violence explanations, we empirically explore the stigma explanation in 
this paper in the context of two gendered occupations – sex work and domestic work – in two 
cities in India. To do this, we analyse the selection of women into two trades – sex work and 
domestic work – and consider the factors that affect the earnings in these trades. Both sex work 
and domestic work constitute workers of very similar profile in India (in terms of age, level of 
education, socio-economic background and gender). The main difference between the two 
groups of workers is that sex workers are stigmatised because of their occupation while domestic 
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workers are not. Our analysis is based on fieldwork conducted by one of the authors in two large 
Indian metropolises - Kolkata and New Delhi – in summer 2013. We analyse this data, taking 
into account potential endogeneity in the estimation. We find that the characteristics of the 
worker alone cannot explain the difference in the earnings between the two groups. We argue 
that the unexplained factor that results in the difference in earnings may be the stigma attached 
to the trade. 
In India, sex workers and domestic workers are predominantly female, uneducated and unskilled 
(Sahni and Shankar, 2011), with the work being done in both cases being considered to be 
innately feminine. The literature also suggests that the workers in these two sectors are similar in 
terms of age of entry (Sen and Sengupta, 2012), level of education and formal training as well as 
the labour market options open to them (Wadhawan, 2013). Accounts from women in sex work 
indicate that many women enter sex work after having provided unpaid sexual services to 
employers in paid domestic work (Durbar Mahila Samanavaya Committee, 2006; Jameela, 
2009). Thus, the existing literature confirms that low paid sex workers and domestic workers are 
comparable groups in terms of the occupational traits and demographic characteristics of the 
individuals involved. 
Our paper makes the following contributions to the literature. First, by comparing two groups of 
women (with similar characteristics) in different types of work, we can identify the extent to 
which pay differentials stem from worker characteristics as opposed to the characteristics of the 
occupation. In doing so, we add to the literature on sex work as well as gendered labour markets. 
Second, we rely on data collected specifically for this purpose through fieldwork in India. It is 
almost impossible to study the sex work industry using secondary data sources. While the Indian 
National Sample Survey (Education and Employment Schedules), for instance, does have a 
category (97) which is meant to include prostitutes, they are placed in this group together with 
beggars and ‘other’. It is therefore impossible to separate the sex workers from others. It also has 
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many missing observations. Primary data of the kind we have collected not only targets sex 
workers and domestic workers directly but also enables us to ask specific questions about their 
work and their agency as well as their constraints and motivations. This gives us first-hand 
insight into these labour markets and helps with our analysis. Third, we make methodological 
progress by allowing for endogeneity. Many estimates of wage returns are confounded by 
sample selection as well as endogeneity bias because women with certain characteristics might 
opt to be sex workers or domestic workers and these characteristics might also influence their 
wages. In this paper, we correct for such endogeneity and in the process obtain causal estimates 
of wages that enable us to determine whether the difference in wages is caused by stigma. We 
use two measures of stigma – in the first we assume that being a sex worker implies stigma (all 
sex workers are stigmatised and they are compared with non-stigmatised domestic workers) and 
in the second, stigma is determined by whether the family accepts the work being done by the 
individual.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in the next section we briefly look at the price 
premium on sex work and place our contribution in the current literature. In the following 
section 3 we discuss the background of this research, especially relating to the similarities and 
differences in the two trades. Section 4 describes the process of data collection including its 
limitations in terms of representativeness of the populations. In section 5 we discuss the 
empirical methods used, including the problem of selection bias and endogeneity. We discuss 
the results in section 6 and conclude in section 7.
Literature Review
As mentioned earlier, three explanations have been put forward in the literature to explain the 
wage premium in sex work – the cost of foregoing marriage, the stigma attached to the work and 
the occupational hazards of employment in this sector. The wage premium debate for sex work 
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5
was initiated by Edlund and Korn (2002) who argued that the reason that sex work was well paid 
in spite of being low skill, labour intensive and female was that sex workers were paid a 
premium for foregoing marriage. The authors argue that a woman cannot be both a sex worker 
and a wife. This together with the fact that marriage is often a source of income for women 
implies that sex work must pay more than what marriage would offer the woman. For Edlund 
and Korn, sex work is defined in terms of the client’s demand for non-reproductive sex (as 
against reproductive sex in a marriage). They therefore argue that the significant difference 
between sex work and marriage for the authors isn’t in the commercial nature of the sexual 
services- women in marriage, the authors argue, also provide paid sexual services – but in the 
access to paternity to children as a consequence of the sexual interaction. While Edlund and 
Korn recognise social stigma and reputation costs for the sex worker, both of which are 
consistent with their model outcomes, the mechanism for tradeoff between sex work and 
marriage isn’t the stigma that might make the sex worker’s access to the marriage market 
limited. Instead, it is that the higher wages are a compensation for the fact that children born to 
women in this trade have no access to paternity. 
The marriage market argument put forward by Edlund and Korn has however been empirically 
refuted by various authors including Arunachalam and Shah (2008) for Ecuador and Mexico, 
Robinson and Yeh (2008) for Western Kenya. The marriage market argument would also not 
hold in case of erotic services that do not involve the possibility of reproduction including non-
vaginal sex and pornography. It would also not hold in cases where sex workers have easy 
access to non-barrier contraception including contraceptive pills. The argument would also not 
be applicable for the premium earned by male sex workers. It is to be noted here that the data in 
this paper also doesn’t concur with Edlund and Korn’s argument with 44.5 percent of the sex 
workers in the sample reporting to being married or with partner. 
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6
The two main alternative arguments put forward in the literature are those relating to the risk 
premium being paid in the trade or the stigma cost of being associated with it. Arunachalam and 
Shah (2008) used the risk premium argument for earnings premium between sex work and other 
trades. They argued that sex work draws a hazard pay, similar to other risky professions like 
policework. In addition, various authors (Arunachalam and Shah, 2011; Rao et al, 2003; 
Robinson and Yeh, 2011) have argued that, within the trade, there is a further premium attached 
to risky sex and to sex workers who engage in unprotected sex. The risk compensation theory 
argues that individuals have differentiated propensity for taking risks, and the propensity is 
influenced by the rewards of risk taking (Adams, 1995). Thus, for a sex worker who makes an 
occupational choice of entering th  trade, her decision is an outcome of weighing her 
perceptions of risk (given her actual or perceived experiences of loss) against the compensation 
received in the trade, which influences her propensity to take the risk in the first place.  Much of 
this literature focuses on the health risks associated with unprotected sex, despite vulnerability to 
violence being an intrinsic part of the occupation. We are interested in the vulnerability to 
violence as the risk due to unprotected sex is a risk both to the sex worker and the client, while 
the vulnerability to abuse is a risk that disproportionately affects the sex worker and not the 
client. There is ample evidence from India and the rest of the world that vulnerability to violence 
is an intrinsic aspect of sex work (Sanders 2004; Brent and Hausbeck 2005; Beattie et al., 2010; 
Sarkar et al., 2008; Argento et al., 2011). However, it is also clear (Deering et al., 2004; 
Blanchard et al., 2005) that this risk is increased by the stigma attached to the occupation. This 
implies that while society at large is more sympathetic to violence faced by domestic workers, 
the sex worker is deemed to be a ‘bad’ woman and hence ‘deserving’ of the violence she faces. 
Hence accessing legal aid or health care in case of abuse is more difficult for the sex worker 
(Lazarus et al., 2013), making sex work more risky in comparison to domestic work. Of course, 
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7
there are risks involved in domestic work too which have been documented in the literature 
(Chuang, 2010; Huang and Yeoh, 2007; Nilsson et al., 1985; Dinat and Peredy, 2007). 
This brings us to the third main argument for the earnings premium in sex work- the stigma 
premium. There is no disagreement in the literature that sex work is stigmatised (Scambler, 
2007; Biradavolu et al., 2012; Cornish, 2006; Benoit et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2011 among 
others). There is also considerable agreement that this stigma perpetuates the other explanations 
(those relating to marriage as well as violence). We will look at it therefore in a little more detail. 
Scambler argues that the shame or the stigma that is attached to the trade is a consequence of the 
moral standpoint on sex and sexuality and is almost exclusively attached to the female supplying 
sexual services. For Scambler, shame or stigma in sex work arises because society draws a 
binary between the ‘whore’/bad woman and ‘Madonna/good woman’ and the Madonna’s 
existence is defined in terms of the whore’s deviance. A sex worker is stigmatised as an 
individual because of the deviance of her trade from socially acceptable forms of work and the 
digression of her behaviour from socially sanctioned norms regarding woman’s behaviour 
around sexuality (Wong et al 2011).
 Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) classified “dirty work” to be that which contains some sort of 
“taint”. They characterise “taint” as physical, which includes contact with garbage, death, 
effluence and noxious conditions et cetera; social, which includes regular contact with 
stigmatised others, servile relationship and moral, which includes ‘sinful’ or dubious virtue, 
deceptive, intrusive, and confrontational methods. Their classification of ‘tainted’ occupations 
therefore includes a variety of occupations ranging from dentists to exotic dancers to police 
interrogators. The argument put forward is that dirty work is not viewed as trivial or unimportant 
work to society, but is viewed as distasteful, if not disgusting. The work is necessary but 
polluting. Ashforth and Kreiner argued in 2014 that the three classes of occupation: i.e. those 
characterised by physical, social or moral taint are all considered dirty, but are perceived 
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8
differently by society. The occupations with physical or social ‘taint’ or ‘dirt’, which would 
include domestic work, are considered ‘necessary evil’ while occupations with moral ‘dirt’, like 
sex work, are considered more evil than necessary. Thus, by their definition while both the 
trades involve ‘dirt’, the ‘dirt’ associated with sex work is less acceptable by society and 
therefore stigmatised more.
The stigma compensation model put forward by Della Giusta et al. (2008), formally introduces 
reputation effects for both the sex worker and the client. The authors show, through 
supply/demand analysis, that the equilibrium price is affected by the reputation of both the client 
and the sex worker. In Della Giusta et al.’s model, the possibility of reputation loss of the client 
(as a consequence of the transaction) has a negative effect on the equilibrium price of 
transactions while the possibility of reputation loss of the sex worker has a positive effect on 
price.
In this paper we will primarily focus on the stigma compensation argument, though we will also 
look into the risk compensation argument. We privilege this argument over the other two 
because we see stigma as the cause underlying both risk in the trade as well as disadvantage in 
the marriage market. For example, Niang et al. (2003) have argued that stigma in the trade 
results in vulnerability of providers of sexual services to abuse and exploitative conditions. 
Similarly, Peracca et al. (1998) found that in Thailand, where the stigma attached to sex work is 
comparatively mild, the general public is more open to the idea that sex workers can marry. 
Even though the authors who put forward the marriage and the risk premium arguments did not 
consider stigma as the mechanism behind the earnings premium, they all acknowledged the 
presence of stigma. 
Scambler (2007) stipulate two types of stigmas that the individual faces – felt and enacted 
stigma. Felt stigma is the shame associated simply with belonging to the stigmatised group and 
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the fear of facing enacted stigma. Enacted stigma, on the other hand, manifests in episodes of 
discrimination against people with the stigmatised condition because of their social or cultural 
unacceptability. Thus, the sex worker experiences felt stigma as soon as she enters the trade 
because she feels the shame of belonging to a trade that is socially unacceptable or because she 
fears discrimination as a consequence of being in the trade. Additionally, she also encounters 
enacted stigma in the form of discriminations as soon as her occupation is known to others. 
Based on this categorisation of stigma, we develop two ways in which stigma can be 
incorporated in our analysis. The individual experiences felt stigma as she enters the trade which 
implies that her reservation price in the trade will be higher than for other occupations, therefore 
implying higher earnings. Thus, a counterfactual analysis (in terms of what would have been the 
outcome had the sex worker been in some other occupation, say domestic work) should be able 
to capture the effect of this felt stigma on her earnings. We capture felt stigma by including the 
status of the individual as a sex worker (as opposed to domestic worker) in the model. We note 
here that there may be concerns of endogeneity, which we address using instruments mentioned 
in section 4. Second, to capture enacted stigma, we consider whether individuals were 
stigmatised by their own families because of their entry into their trade. We use a variable 
constructed from the self-reported experience of whether the individual’s family accept their 
work or would have accepted their work had they known. This measures the discrimination she 
might expect to face or the enacted stigma she encounters, starting from home. The construction 
of the variables is discussed in section 3.
Data and Summary Statistics
In this paper we attempt to understand the selection of otherwise similar individuals into two 
trades – sex work and domestic work - and what factors affect labour market outcomes in terms 
of the earnings of the worker. Using primary data for sex workers and domestic workers in two 
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10
cities in India, we ask the following research questions: First, is there any systematic difference 
between the earnings of workers in the two trades given that the formal education/training 
requirements are low in both trades? Second, can the higher earnings in sex work be understood 
as a compensation for the stigma associated with the trade? Alternatively, can the higher 
earnings also be explained by the risk of abuse in the trade? 
To analyse these questions, we use data from a primary field survey of sex workers and domestic 
workers in two metropolitan centres in India - Delhi NCR (National Capital Region) and Kolkata 
(previously known as Calcutta) - undertaken by one of the authors. The survey was undertaken 
in July-August 2013. For the sex workers in Kolkata, we targeted 4 red-light areas of South 
Kolkata – Kalighat, Chetla, Khiddirpur and Rambagan – and 3 red-light areas in North Kolkata 
(Rabindra Sarani, Set Bagan and SonaGacchi). The first set of sex workers contacted in Kolkata 
were through the collective of sex workers called Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee 
(henceforth called Durbar)i. The subsequent participants were identified by this first set of sex 
workersii. The officials from Durbar also put us in touch with a non government organisation 
working with Delhi based sex workers called Savera which helped us identify sex workers in 
Delhi. In Delhi, our survey areas were Rohini District in West Delhi and GB Road in East Delhi. 
Our domestic worker sample was chosen from the slum areas in the vicinity of the red-light 
areas. This allowed us to concentrate on women with demographic and socio-economic profiles 
similar to those of our sex worker sample. While sex workers for our survey were identified with 
the help of NGOs, for domestic workers, we identified employers of domestic workers who gave 
us contacts of their employees and also identified domestic workers living in a particular area. In 
both cases, the workers then introduced us to other workers. 
Not surprisingly, snowball sampling of this kind, while dictated by the nature of the work being 
considered, is limited in terms of the representativeness of the resultant sample. In particular, for 
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sex workers we are more likely to have interviewed workers with contacts with the NGO. These 
workers are likely to be either those with significant problems being dealt with by the NGO or 
those who are more pro-active in the industry and therefore have become involved with the 
NGO. Our sample may therefore be biased. Similarly, for domestic workers, our sample might 
be biased towards those who had good relations with their employers. However, given that sex 
workers in particular are hidden and hard to reach, this survey method is often the only feasible 
method of data collection that can ensure both the privacy and safety of the respondent as well as 
the safety of the researcher (Goodman, 1961; Noy, 2008). Consequently many studies on sex 
work collect data in this manner (Gerassi et al., 2016; Boels and Verhage, 2016; Kramar, 
2004)iii. Our dataset constitutes 521 individuals: 274 are live outiv domestic workers and 247 are 
lower end brothel based sex workers.  
Conservative estimates suggest that there are between 2 and 3 million women employed in the 
sex industry in India and anything between 2.5 and 7 million women employed in domestic 
workv Both these informal sector occupations have similarities that are hard to miss. Both have a 
strong gender element, insofar as one, workers employed in these trades are usually women the 
world over, and two, these two services have been traditionally deemed as ‘women’s work’. 
Furthermore, these two trades are similar in terms of their formal skill and training requirements. 
Low paid domestic work and sex work require very little or no formal education or training. The 
legal status of both these jobs is characterised by obscurities and is hard to interpret and 
implement for the benefit of employees (Sharma and Kunduri, 2015; EPW editorial, 2014). 
Together with the lack of regulatory framework, it also implies vulnerability to abuse for women 
in both the trades which has been documented by numerous authors (Huang and Yeoh, 2007; 
Sarkar et al., 2008; Murty, 2009).
Brothel based sex workers have a place of residence (often the brothel, though sometimes sex 
workers work in the brothel but reside elsewhere in the city with their families) which 
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12
differentiates them from street-based sex workers, who are often homeless. Part-time domestic 
workers also have a place of residence though this is different from their workplace. We note 
that we have restricted ourselves to individuals who are currently not bonded to any brothel 
(even though they may have been bonded in the past). Consequently, we are considering 
individual sex workers who have some degree of ‘choice’ regarding involvement in the trade. 
Similarly, the advantage of considering ‘live-out’ domestic workers is that they are likely to 
have more mobility and freedom to negotiate, which may not always be the case for live-in 
domestic workers, who have very little freedom to manoeuvre and negotiate. 
Summary statistics (Table 1) confirm that the two samples are similar (in terms of socio-
economic background and levels of education). While our sex worker sample is younger on 
average (at 32 years) than our domestic worker sample (37 years), the age of entry of women 
into both the professions is remarkably similar at an average of 21.4 years for sex workers and 
20.4 for domestic workers. While there are no national representative studies for us to be able to 
compare the representativeness of our sample, Saggurti et al. (2011) in their study of 5498 sex 
workers from 22 districts in India find the age of entry into sex work in their sample to be 24.1 
years, which is older than our sample average, indicating that our sample doesn’t overstate the 
age of entry in sex work. In terms of educational attainment, in our sample 68 percent and 70 
percent of sex workers and domestic workers respectively have never been enrolled in school 
indicating that most individuals in both the occupations have little or no formal education. 
Having said this, the proportion of women who have finished school or higher education 
amongst sex workers is 2.8 percent while that of domestic workers is 0.3 percent. 
Both groups have a higher than national average proportion of Scheduled Caste women (29 
percent for sex workers and 35 percent for domestic workers) in comparison to 16.6 percent of 
scheduled castes in the national populationvi. This is confirmed in the literature which suggests 
that sex workers and domestic workers are more likely to be of the ’lower’ castes (Basu et al. 
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2004, Halli et al. 2006, Raghuram, 2001) and the sex work sample has higher than national 
average proportion of non-Hindu (mostly Muslim) individuals (at 27.53 percent), in comparison 
to 5.83 percent for domestic workers in this sample and 14.2 percent for the country as a whole).
The family background of the two groups also demonstrates similarities. Approximately 24 
percent of sex workers and 26 percent of domestic workers in our sample were raised in female 
headed households and on average they were brought up in large families with 2 male and 3 
female siblings. Surprisingly, about 44 percent of sex workers and 40 percent of domestic 
workers grew up in households who owned the house that they lived in. 
There are some differences between the two groups. First, while 31 percent of the domestic 
workers came from families which owned land, only 7 percent of the sex workers’ families did 
so. Thus, sex workers seem to belong to land-poor households relative to domestic workers. 
Second, there is a significant difference in terms of experience of past violence. On average 
39.34 percent of sex workers have faced physical, verbal or sexual abuse in their families before 
joining the trade and almost 30 percent faced violenc  in their previous occupationvii. In 
comparison to this, only 1.42 percent of women in domestic work faced abuse in their previous 
occupations though 19.34 percent faced violence in their families We expect this to be a 
determining factor in the selection of individuals in the trade and we will exploit this difference 
in our estimation in the next section. 
As we discussed before, the other difference between the two groups is regarding the stigma that 
the individual faces regarding their work. In the questionnaire survey the individuals were asked 
‘whether their family knew and accepted their trade’ to which the possible responses were 
strongly disagree, disagree, neutral, agree, strongly agree. We create a binary variable 
‘stigma_family’ that takes value 0 if the individual’s response to the question was ‘agree’ or 
‘strongly agree’, and 1 otherwiseviii. Thus, the variable stigma_family measures whether or not 
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the individual is stigmatised for her trade by her family. While for the domestic workers 93.66 
percent of the individuals reported that their families knew and accepted their trade, for sex 
workers this was only 25.62 percent. 
(Table 1 here)
Empirical Methodology: Identification, Endogeneity and Selection on Unobservables 
We estimate the effect of occupational stigma on earnings outcomes using ordinary least squares 
regression and instrumental variables regression. As mentioned before we conceptualize stigma 
in two ways. First, we categorise being a sex worker as equivalent to being stigmatised because 
sex workers will face both enacted and felt stigma. Second, we use a self- reported variable 
capturing acceptance by the family of the individual. We therefore estimate two separate models, 
one in which we assume that being a sex worker (as opposed to a domestic worker) 
automatically implies stigma and a second in which the stigma is more directly included in the 
model. We begin by regressing our dependent variabl  ‘log of hourly earnings’ on ‘sex work’ 
(which takes value 1 if the individual is a sex worker and 0 if she is a domestic worker): 
                                                  (1)𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑠𝑒𝑥 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 +  𝜹𝒊 ∗ 𝒙𝒊 + 𝜖𝑖
Where  is the log of hourly earnings,  is the coefficient of estimation for the variable sex 𝑦𝑖 𝛽𝑖
work,   is the vector of exogenous covariates which includes age, square of age, level of 𝒙𝒊
education, whether family of the individual is in the industry, whether the individual is high 
caste Hindu, location (whether the individual is based in Delhi) and hours worked.
In this estimation, we might expect to be biased because variables like personality traits or 𝛽𝑖
preferences that may influence entry into sex work as opposed to domestic work are omitted 
from the model. These traits may, for instance, be risk preferences or even time horizons. 
Individuals with stronger risk preferences are more likely to choose sex work as might those 
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with shorter time horizons. The problem with these omitted variables is that they are likely to 
influence both the choice of sector to work in as well as incomes earned in these sectors. To 
correct for this endogeneity, we use an instrumental variables method where the sex work 
dummy is treated as endogenous and is explicitly modelled in Stage 1 and the predicted values 
from this stage are used in the second stage. To ensure that the relationship is identified, we need 
an instrument which is significantly correlated with the sex worker dummy but is also 
uncorrelated with the error term in the outcome equation (log of hourly earnings). The variable 
we include as an instrument in the first stage equation is whether or not the individual faced 
violence before joining the trade in their past occupation or in their families while growing up. 
We expect past abuse to influence the individual’s choice of activity because it will affect their 
self-esteem as well as their aspirations, and this could influence whether or not the individual 
becomes a sex worker. To the extent that perception of self and aspirations affect the 
individual’s earnings, it would be via occupational choice rather than directly. Our data has two 
variables that measure past violence- whether the individual faced violence in their family 
(before joining the trade) and whether the individual faced violence in their past occupationix. 
We include both these as instruments. Summary statistics of these two variables are given in 
Table 1. It is to be noted that these variables have negligible correlation (coefficients of -0.0573 
and -0.0082, both insignificant) with our dependent variable, the log of earnings, leading us to 
conclude provisionally that the earnings premium of sex workers is not related to past violence.
Our second way of conceptualising stigma is in terms of whether or not the individual’s family 
accepts the individual’s trade. We use the variable stigma_family as described in the section 
above as the main covariate here. Our baseline OLS model here has dependent variable ‘log of 
hourly earnings’ and our main covariate is ‘family accepts’: 
                                (2)𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑔𝑚𝑎_𝑓𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦 +  𝜹𝒊 ∗ 𝒙𝒊 + 𝜖𝑖
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Like in the case of the earlier model, we cannot expect stigma_family to be exogenous. For 
example, there may be a problem of reverse causality. The family of the individual may be more 
accepting of their occupation if they earn high income. In this case, we will instrument this 
variable using past violence in the family. The acceptance of the family of the individual’s trade 
may be correlated to whether or not the individual faced violence in the family. However, since 
there is no reason for violence in the past occupation to be related to the family’s acceptance, we 
will drop this variable as an instrument. 
Alternative Explanation
As discussed above, it is possible that the wage difference between sex workers and domestic 
workers can be explained as a premium for the vulnerability to abuse in the trade. We are 
interested to see if the experience of violence has any effect on the log of earnings of the 
individual involved. Since the nature of violence is different in the two trades we concentrate on 
the subsection of our sample only constituting of sex workers. To consider the effect of 
experience of abuse on the log of earnings, we regress our dependent variable ‘log of hourly 
earnings’ on the covariate abused in the trade (which takes value 1 if yes, 0 otherwise):
   (3)𝑦𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖 ∗ 𝑎𝑏𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒 +  𝜹𝒊 ∗ 𝒙𝒊 + 𝜖𝑖
 We note that the covariate here is abuse in the trade. This is different from the instrumental 
variables used in Stage 1 which relate to past abuse faced by the individual before joining the 
trade. The problem of endogeneity persists even in this case as there may be unobservable 
factors that affect both the experience of violence in the trade as well as earnings from the trade. 
These may include the individual’s risk aversion. An individual who is averse to taking risk may 
experience both lower levels of violence in the trade, as well as lower earnings. We will continue 
to use instrumental variable regression to get around this problem. The correlation between past 
abuse and current abuse, in the context of sex work, has been noted in the literature (Silbert and 
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Pines, 1981; El-Bassel et al. 2004). We can therefore use the latter as an instrument for the 
former. 
Results
Difference in Wages by Occupations
In this section, we will begin by considering the raw as well as conditional wage differentials 
between the two occupations to see if they are significant. While the former can be tested using 
simple t-tests, the latter will require the Oaxaca-Blinder Method. The raw difference in the 
earnings of the two groups is 1.272 which suggests that sex workers on average earn 3.57 times 
what the domestic worker earns per hour (as ). Details are presented in table 2. 𝑒1.272 = 3.57
(Table 2 here)
Figure 1 plots log of hourly earnings of sex workers and domestic workers from our sample 
against age. The scatter plot indicates that even without controlling for other covariates the 
earnings of sex workers are higher than those of domestic workers over all age groups across the 
sample. The difference is especially stark in the early years of their career and narrows as the 
workers grow older until it finally disappears when the individuals approach their fifties. 
(Figure 1 here)
Turning to the conditional wage differences between these two groups of workers, we present 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of the log of hourly earnings in Table 3. The OB 
decomposition will allow us to determine the extent of the raw difference that can be explained 
by the model and the proportion that is left unexplained. Panel A of table 3 reports the mean 
predictions of the log of earnings according to whether an individual is a sex worker or a 
domestic worker. Panel B decomposes the difference in log of hourly earnings into three parts. 
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The first row reports the differences in endowments which corresponds to the predicted 
outcomes according to personal characteristics (Jann, 2008). We have a negative value for this. 
This implies that if the earnings were only explained by individual characteristics, the earnings 
of domestic workers should have been greater than of sex workers. The second row (titled 
coefficients) measures the expected change in the domestic workers’ mean outcome if the 
domestic workers had sex workers’ coefficients. The third component is the interaction term 
measuring the simultaneous effect of differences in endowment and coefficient, which in our 
case is not significant. The fourth and the fifth rows report the explained and unexplained 
components calculated using the Neumark method (obtaining the reference coefficient from a 
pooled regression). The explained coefficient is negative, again signifying that if the difference 
in the earnings could be explained by the coefficients, the earnings of the domestic workers 
should be greater than the sex workers. The unexplained component constitutes factors that 
cannot be explained by the individual characteristics. In the case of sex workers and domestic 
workers these factors may be stigma or vulnerability to abuse or a combination of the two. This 
exercise gives us an indication that the personal characteristics aren’t enough to explain the 
differences in the earnings in the two groups.  However we cannot make any causal claims based 
on the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition results as individuals may select into the two groups. We 
take selection into the trades in the next section. 
(Table 3 here)
Stigma in the trade
 As discussed before, we identify stigma in two ways. We first argue that simply being in sex 
work evokes stigma. This would increase the reservation wage of sex workers. Our first measure 
of stigma is therefore ‘being in sex work’. We first conceptualise stigma as felt stigma which the 
sex worker experiences as a consequence of simply belonging to the group, which increases the 
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reservation price at entry into this trade. The earnings differential met by a sex worker over and 
above what she would have earned in an otherwise similar trade (in this case domestic work) 
should provide us with the felt stigma compensation for being in sex work. This we do by 
estimating ‘log of hourly earnings’ with ‘being sex worker’ as the main covariate. Since there 
may be omitted variables, we use incidents of past violence (violence in the family before 
joining the trade and violence in the past occupation) as instruments. The results of these models 
(OLS and IV first and second stage) are presented in columns (1)-(3) in Table 4. 
Our second way of identifying stigma is by using the variable ‘family_accepts’ as denoting 
stigma. This is a variable constructed from the individual’s reporting of how they apprehend 
stigma from their family. Again there may be omitted variables that affect both the variable 
‘stigma_family’ and log of hourly earnings. We use ‘violence in the family before joining the 
trade’ as the instrumental variable in this case. The results of these models are present in 
columns (4)-(6) in table 4.
(Table 4 here)
The coefficient of the variable ‘being sex worker’ is approximately 1.54 for both OLS and IV 
models (columns 1-3 in Table 4) suggesting that being in the stigmatised trade (sex work) results 
in the individual earning  about 4.67 (which is e1.54) times more than she would have earned had 
she been in a similar, but non-stigmatised trade (domestic work). Furthermore, being stigmatised 
for their work by their family results in an increase in log of hourly earnings of 1.91 which 
implies that the individual earns 6.7 times what would have been the case otherwise. Both these 
results together give us confidence in our argument that the sex worker is paid a premium for 
stigma in the trade. 
We will spend a few moments to discuss the validity of the instruments. The endogeneity test for 
both the IV models gives insignificant results implying that both sex work and stigma_family are 
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endogenous. Furthermore, the F-statistic of the first stage is highly significant for both the 
models taking values of 22.095 and 7.444 indicating that the first stage condition of the 
instruments is valid. For the model where the endogenous variable is sex work, the over 
identification tests also give us insignificant results indicating that our instruments are not 
invalid.  There is unfortunately no way to statistically prove the exclusion principle. We believe 
that the entire impact of past violence on current earnings if through the choice of the 
stigmatised occupation. 
One unobservable factor that may be of concern is the impact of violence on the self-worth of 
the individual. However, we might expect this impact to be the opposite of the outcome that we 
see in our results. More specifically, self-worth may be reduced by past violence, and their 
reduced self-worth may reduce current earnings. This argument would imply that individuals 
who have faced violence in the past should earn less rather than more, as we see in the case of 
sex workers. This implies that even if past-violence does have an effect on the individual’s 
current self-worth, and if current self-worth does affect the individual’s earning, the effect is 
probably negligible or the reverse of that in this model. 
An alternative explanation
One alternative explanation in the literature for the sex workers’ earnings premium is that since 
sex work involves risks, the sex workers earn a hazard premium over others. We have argued 
earlier in the paper that it is difficult to separate the risks from the stigma, as often the risks are a 
consequence of the stigma. For example, sex workers may be vulnerable to physical, emotional 
and sexual abuse at work. However, the reason why they are more vulnerable than women in 
other informal sector work is precisely because women in other trades are more likely to be able 
to access legal, medical and community help while those in sex work won’t. However, one way 
of separating stigma from risks may be to look at hazard pay within sex work. We can do this by 
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looking at whether being abused in the trade has an effect on the earnings of women within sex 
work. Since we are looking only at the subsample of women who are in sex work, everyone in 
the sample is by definition stigmatised, and any premium of abuse will be strictly a hazard pay. 
Once again we use the instruments of past violence (at home before joining the trade and in their 
past trade) as there may be omitted variables that may affect both being abused in the trade and 
current hourly earnings. 
 The results presented in table 5 report the effect that being abused (currently in the trade) has on 
current earnings for sex workers. Being abused doesn’t have a significant impact. This implies 
that the hazard pay for vulnerability to abuse isn’t significant in our sample. This, together with 
the significant results for the stigma compensation give us confidence that the market is 
providing a premium for sex workers for the stigma that is associated with the trade. 
(Table 5 here)
Conclusion
This paper considers the wage differentials earned by sex workers in India using data collected 
during primary fieldwork in Kolkata and Delhi. We find that sex workers in India earn a 
premium over domestic workers. We analyse whether this premium relates to the stigma 
attached to the occupation by using two measures of stigma – that which arises from merely 
being in the trade and that which arises from the sex worker’s perception that her family would 
not accept her trade. We find that both are significant contributors to the wage differential she 
earns. We also test (though preliminarily) an alternative explanation of the wage differential 
where we analyse whether the premium relates to the violence suffered in the trade. We find that 
this does not have a significant impact on the earnings of the sex worker. We note here that we 
are only considering general abuse which could be physical, sexual or emotional. The data does 
not allow us to differentiate between the different forms of violence and hence we are unable to 
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see whether a specific form of violence has any effect on the outcomes. We therefore conclude 
that the main determinant of the wage differential of the sex workers over that of the domestic 
workers is the stigma attached to sex work, which will increase the reservation price demanded 
before a woman enters this occupation. Our results contribute to the existing literature on 
gendered labour markets as they make a comparison of two trades that attract labour of similar 
socio-economic background and educational attainment. 
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0 20 40 60 80
age
Fitted values Fitted values
sex workers domestic workers






Age (mean) 37.28 32.23 34.881
Level of Education
No education (%) 53.28 54.25 53.74
Started primary (%) 17.52 13.77 15.74
Completed primary (%) 13.14 8.10 10.75
Started secondary (%) 14.23 15.38 14.78
Completed secondary (%) 1.46 5.26 3.26
Higher (%) 0.36 2.83 1.54
Total observations 274 246 520
Page 23 of 39
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/fjds





























































For Peer Review Only
24
Marital status
Never married (%) 9.49 12.15 10.75
Currently with partner (%) 72.26 44.53 59.12
Total Observation 274 247 521
Religion and Caste
Non-Hindu  (%) 5.84 27.53 16.12
SC (%) 35.04 28.74 32.05
ST (%) 2.55 3.64 3.07
OBC (%) 21.17 10.53 16.12
Hindu
General (%) 35.40 29.55 32.63
 Total Observations 274 247 521
Family Structure
Male headed (%) 74.15 75.82 74.95
Female headed (%) 25.85 24.18 25.05
Total observations 263 244 507
Order among siblings (mean) 2.50 2.60 2.54
Number of male siblings (mean) 2.01 1.83 1.93
Number of female siblings (mean) 2.73 2.68 2.71
Asset Ownership of families of individual before joining the trade
House (%) 40.15 43.85 41.89
Total Observations 274 244 518
Land (%) 31.02 6.64 19.61
Total Observations 274 241 515
Jewellery (%) 20.15 30.74 25.15
Total Observations 273 244 517
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Violence faced by the individual before joining the trade
Violence in past occupation (%) 1.42 20.99 11.89
Total Observations 211 243 454
Violence at home (%) 19.34 39.34 28.76
Total Observations 274 244 518
Incidence of violence in the past (%) 24.89 52.46 39.23
Total Observations 225 244 469
Family knows and accepts the individual’s occupation
Yes (%) 93.66 25.62 61.37
Total Observations 268 242 510
Table 2: Difference in log of hourly Earnings- TTest
Group      Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Sex worker 225 4.228 0.068
Domestic worker 274 2.956 0.035






H0: diff=0; Ha: diff<0, Pr(T<t)=0.000
Table 3: Decomposition of ‘log of hourly earnings’ for sex workers and domestic workers
VARIABLES sex worker
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Oaxaca Blinder decomposition. Covariates used: Age, Square of Age, Level of education, Hindu 
upper caste, Family member in their industry, Not a migrant , Location= delhi, Hours worked. * 
p<0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01.  Standard errors presented in parenthesis.
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Table 4: Estimation of Log of hourly earnings for pooled sample of sex workers and 
domestic workers
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS first second OLS first second




age 0.0152 -0.0136 0.00164 0.0168 -0.00582 0.0238
(0.0171) (0.00973) (0.0196) (0.0210) (0.0101) (0.0239)
square of age -0.00033 0.00049 -0.000197 -0.000432 -0.0003 -0.000410
(0.00022) (0.000121) (0.000239) (0.000265) (0.000128) (0.000294)
level of education 0.0431 -0.0155 0.0322 0.0551 0.00200 0.0516
(0.0279) (0.0150) (0.0297) (0.0340) (0.0164) (0.0377)
high caste hindu 0.0357 -0.0727* 0.0266 -0.0203 -0.0570 0.0395
(0.0748) (0.0396) (0.0810) (0.0910) (0.0439) (0.111)
family in the industry 0.0132 -0.280*** 0.0768 -0.239** -0.267*** 0.0406
(0.0769) (0.0403) (0.119) (0.0927) (0.0431) (0.244)
local (not a migrant) 0.136* -0.152*** 0.126 0.00278 -0.130*** 0.143
(0.0744) (0.0394) (0.0930) (0.0901) (0.0431) (0.149)
Location: Delhi 0.615*** 0.0125 0.697*** 0.402*** -0.00290 0.418***
(0.0775) (0.0436) (0.0856) (0.0937) (0.0454) (0.104)
hours worked -0.021*** 0.00298*** -0.022***
-
0.0191*** 0.00310*** -0.023***
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(0.00140) (0.000774) (0.00186) (0.00172) (0.000818) (0.00334)
-0.0113 0.0831** -0.0431 0.0928 0.0106 0.0771grew up in male headed 
nuclear family (0.0701) (0.0379) (0.0794) (0.0856) (0.0414) (0.0956)
0.0584 0.0728 0.0365 0.125 0.0837* 0.0408Growing up family 
owned house (0.0796) (0.0444) (0.0909) (0.0980) (0.0472) (0.127)
0.0860 -0.349*** 0.0859 -0.284** -0.237*** -0.0234Growing up family 
owned land (0.0969) (0.0532) (0.155) (0.116) (0.0550) (0.243)
0.0475 0.124*** 0.0557 0.298*** -0.0680 0.371***Growing up family 
owned jewellery (0.0861) (0.0461) (0.0949) (0.105) (0.0506) (0.130)
Instruments
0.160*** 0.120***Faced violence at home 
before joining trade (0.0401) (0.0439)
0.298***Faced occupation in last 
occupation (0.0576)
Constant 3.189*** 0.898*** 3.550*** 3.699*** 0.650*** 2.965***
(0.361) (0.201) (0.488) (0.441) (0.211) (0.758)
Observations 485 428 428 476 476 476




Durban Score 0.0277 2.01976
p value 0.8677 0.1553
Wu-Hausman 0.0267 0.1617
p value 0.8701 0.1617
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*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001. Standard errors presented in parenthesis
Table 5: Estimation for log of hourly earnings for subsample of sex workers only
(1) (2) (3)
OLS first second
Abuse in trade 0.0242 -0.0185
(0.129) (0.515)
age 0.0850* -0.0608** 0.0825
(0.0492) (0.0256) (0.0557)
square of age -0.00170** 0.000973*** -0.00166**
(0.000697) (0.000361) (0.000821)
level of education 0.0210 -0.0466* 0.0191
(0.0472) (0.0246) (0.0510)
high caste hindu 0.144 0.0815 0.148
(0.137) (0.0720) (0.140)
family in the industry 0.295* 0.128 0.300*
(0.173) (0.0907) (0.180)
local (not a migrant) 0.230 -0.0308 0.229*
(0.142) (0.0756) (0.138)
Location: Delhi 0.600*** -0.0249 0.598***
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(0.144) (0.0758) (0.140)
hours worked -0.0255*** -4.60e-05 -0.0255***
(0.00234) (0.00124) (0.00228)
grew up in male headed nuclear family -0.0105 -0.0682 -0.0134
(0.131) (0.0690) (0.131)
Growing up family owned house 0.0753 0.195** 0.0833
(0.158) (0.0829) (0.179)
Growing up family owned land 0.176 -0.0820 0.172
(0.256) (0.135) (0.253)
Growing up family owned jewell ry 0.0805 -0.175* 0.0726
(0.177) (0.0944) (0.195)
Instruments
Faced violence at home before joining trade 0.229***
(0.0656)
Faced occupation in last occupation 0.0595
(0.0784)
Constant 4.112*** 1.269*** 4.167***
(0.867) (0.447) (1.059)
Observations 220 220 220
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* p<0.1, ** p< 0.05, *** p<0.01.  Standard errors presented in parenthesis.
i Durbar is the largest collective of sex workers with membership of 65000 sex workers from West Bengal, India. 
Information regarding their work can be found at http://durbar.org/
ii In Kolkata the sex worker participants worked and resided in four red-light areas in South Kolkata- Kalighat, 
Chetla, Khiddirpur and Rambagan and in three red-light areas in North Kolkata- Rabindra Sarani, Set Bagan and 
Sonagachhi. Officials of Durbar further put us in contact with a sex workers collective in Delhi named Savera who 
helped identifty sex workers in Rohini district which is a suburb in West Delhi and GB Road which is located in East-
central Delhi. 
iii The research method and questionnaire were approved by ethical committees at the University of Reading and 
Durbar to ensure that questions were not intrusive to the privacy or safety of the respondents and also that no sex 
worker under the age of 18 was recruited for the study. The researcher had proposed a reimbursement of Rs 50 for 
the participant's time. However, Durbar, the organisation that provided primary contact for the study were strongly 
opposed to the idea of providing monitory incentives to women who were recruited through their contact. One 
program officer had argued in a meeting with the researcher that providing monitory incentives would  build 
expectations of being rewarded for participation in any other studies that the sex workers may be required to 
participate in, and locally funded smaller studies (including studies carried out by Durbar) will often not have the 
funding to meet such expectations. Consequently the sex worker participants were not paid for participation while 
the domestic worker participants were. The interviews were carried out by the researcher and three research 
assistants (one male and two female) in Bengali and Hindi. While all efforts were made to ensure that the participant 
was alone during the time of the interview, it was often not possible. Where the participants were interviewed at 
their residence, in all cases the homes were a small one roomed space with multiple members of the family living 
together and in such cases it was often not possible to ask other family members to leave the premise.  Often, in 
the case of sex work, two women resided together in such one room spaces with one sex worker acting as the 
madam/pimp for the other. In such cases two of the interviewers would simultaneously engage the two women, 
one inside the house/room and one outside so that the responses would not be influenced by the presence of the 
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other sex worker. Consent was acquired at the beginning of each interview and the respondents were assured that 
they could stop at any point of the interview. 
iv Live-out domestic workers are workers who do not reside at the homes of their employers
v Source: Mukherjee and Mukherjee (2007) for estimate on sex work and International Labour Organisation (2013)  
for estimate on domestic work.
vi Scheduled Castes (SC), Scheduled Tribes (ST) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) are official categorisation of 
groups that have been historically discriminated against because of their caste or tribal background in India. The 
Constitution of India recognises these groups as socio-economically deprived and endeavours to positively 
discriminate in their favour in their favour in educational institutions, government jobs, and seats in legislative 
assembly.  
vii  Because of sensitive nature of past violence, we were not able to gather enough information on the exact type 
of abuse, and when the abuse occurred. There were concerns that detailed questions on types of past violence 
may have psychological effects on the respondents that were beyond the scope of this study, and could potentially 
derail the conversation from the focused questionnaire. We can thus only look at the effect of having faced 
violence at some point after joining the trade on the earnings of the individual. 
viii As robustness check we estimated an alternative model where we included the category ‘neutral’ to the ‘agree’ 
categories. That is, we constructed the variable ‘stigma_family’ to take value 0 if the individual’s response to the 
question was ‘neutral’, ‘agree’ and ‘strongly agree’ and 1 otherwise. The resulting values of the estimation were 
similar to those presented in Table 4 in sign and significance and slightly larger in magnitude. 
ix We additionally ran the models discussed below on subset of women who had a previous occupation (i.e. were 
not unemployed before joining their current trade). The results aren’t categorically different and have similar 
magnitude and significance as those presented here. These results can be made available on request. 
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